| Title | Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation |
|---|---|
| Authors | Guillen, Pablo , Fatas, Enrique , BRAÑAS GARZA, PABLO ERNESTO |
| External publication | Si |
| Means | J. Econ. Psychol. |
| Scope | Article |
| Nature | Científica |
| JCR Quartile | 2 |
| SJR Quartile | 1 |
| SJR Impact | 1.437 |
| Publication date | 01/12/2010 |
| ISI | 000285489500005 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2010.07.002 |
| Abstract | This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are Informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart and by 50% after the surprise restart In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment (C) 2010 Elsevier BV All rights reserved |
| Keywords | Social dilemmas; Conditional cooperation |
| Universidad Loyola members |