| Title |
Harsanyi Power Solutions in Coalitional Control Systems |
| Authors |
MUROS, FRANCISCO JAVIER, Algaba, Encarnacion , Maria Maestre, Jose , Camacho, Eduardo F. |
| External publication |
Si |
| Means |
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL |
| Scope |
Article |
| Nature |
Científica |
| JCR Quartile |
1 |
| SJR Quartile |
1 |
| JCR Impact |
5.007 |
| SJR Impact |
3.433 |
| Web |
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85028373089&doi=10.1109%2fTAC.2017.2651642&partnerID=40&md5=95c8f608eff5db02fcbe3a2a8bad6103 |
| Publication date |
01/07/2017 |
| ISI |
000404299300019 |
| Scopus Id |
2-s2.0-85028373089 |
| DOI |
10.1109/TAC.2017.2651642 |
| Abstract |
In coalitional control the connections among the different parts of a control network evolve dynamically to achieve a trade-off between communication burden and control performance, and the coalition choices are made by selecting the network topology with minimal payoff. This work analyzes how Harsanyi power solutions for games in coalitional control schemes, which generalize the Shapley value in this context, can be used to quantify the value of the communication links under different control topologies. To this end, a game among these links is considered, and the payoff that each link receives is determined by the Harsanyi power solutions, which take into account the communication costs and the predicted infinite-horizon costs for these topologies. The concept of link power measure as a centrality index to configure the communication costs is also introduced. As a result, a more computationally efficient design method with respect to previous works has been proposed. |
| Keywords |
Coalitional control; cooperative game theory; Harsanyi power solutions; link power measures; Shapley value |
| Universidad Loyola members |
|
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